The importance of trade and investment agreements for health is now widely acknowledged in the literature, with much attention now focused on the of impact investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. However, much of the analysis of such agreements in the health field remains largely descriptive. We theorise the implications of ISDS mechanisms for health policy by integrating the concept of global constitutionalism with veto point theory. It is argued that attempts to , through a proliferation of International Investment Agreements (IIAs), has created a series of new veto points at which corporations may seek to block new policies aimed at protecting or enhancing public health. The multiplicity of new veto points in this global IIA reates opportunities for corporations to exploit the agreements, and associated veto points, through which they are most likely to succeed in blocking or deterring new regulation. These concepts are illustrated with reference to two case studies of investor-state disputes involving a transnational tobacco company, but the implications of the analysis are of equal relevance for a range of other industries and health issues.
Introduction
The importance of international trade and investment for health is now widely acknowledged (McGrady 2011 , Voon et al. 2014 , Alemanno and Garde 2015 . Much of the controversy surrounding both TPP and TTIP (as well as other IIAs) focuses on their inclusion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which grant corporations standing to bring legal action directly against signatory governments in order to guarantee the rights and protections they are afforded within the agreement. In many cases, criticisms levelled at ISDS have focused specifically on the health impacts of IIAs (Khan et al. 2015 , Weiss 2015 , Jarman 2014 .
Despite these concerns, the literature in this area remains largely descriptive in nature. The current article aims to investigate some of the key issues which ISDS raises for health policy, through an engagement with two bodies of literature from international law and political science. The application of these theories deepens our understanding of both the nature and the extent of the threat posed to public health by the proliferation of ISDS clauses in IIAs.
First, we place developments in the international trade and investment regime within the context of wider debates in international relations and international law about processes of constitutionalisation above the level of the state (i.e., at the international or global level) (Thompson 2012 , May 2014 , Schwöbel 2012 , Schwöbel 2011 , Cass 2001 , Peters 2012 . This literature offers both a conceptual framework through which to interpret and understand the current evolution of the international trade and investment regime, and the basis on which to critique the specific forms of constitutionalisation put in place by the agreements we identify. We argue that whilst adopting the procedural, technocratic language of constitutionalism and the rule of law, the global trade and investment regime now emerging furthers the interests of a particular set of actors. IIAs, and ISDS clauses in particular, institutionalise and embed the practices and assumptions central to neo-liberal forms of political economy, privileging the interests of transnational corporations (TNCs) over those of other actors.
Veto point theory in political science provides a second analytical lens (Tsebelis 2002 , Immergut 1992 . The concept of veto points allows us to fully comprehend the significance of ISDS, not just for health policy, but for public policy more generally. Veto point theory explains the inherent bias towards the status quo in policy-making by identifying the key points in a political system at which policy initiatives can potentially be blocked. Systems with more veto points experience greater policy inertia, whilst those with fewer veto points are more open to change.
International trade and investment agreements place obligations on states to ensure national laws comply with the undertakings made in those agreements. In so doing, governments bind themselves and their successors to act in certain ways, and curtail their freedom to pursue certain policy agendas which may run counter to the tenets of these agreements. The enactment of these agreements opens governments up to the possibility of legal challenges, should they fail to comply.
The WTO allows member states to bring cases against other states whose policies are deemed to infringe the principles of WTO agreements. WTO law acts as a potential veto point in the policy process. However, key differences exist between the WTO dispute system and ISDS, which make the latter a potentially far more significant hurdle for policy initiatives to surmount. Since ISDS clauses afford corporations the ability to challenge unfavourable policies directly through private arbitration panels, they signify a huge expansion in the number of potential veto points and the number of interest groups which may attempt to exploit these. Dispute initiation is no longer limited to the states which are party to an agreement, but now includes any private investor whose crossborder activities fall within the remit of the agreement. The expansion in the number of IIAs concluded has led to greater complexity in the international trade and investment regime, creating a through which to challenge the adoption of a particular law. This body of agreements reinforce the current business-friendly policy regime and represent a potential brake which corporations with vested interests can apply to any form of public health or social policy which appears to undermine their interests.
We first elaborate the relevant aspects of the literature on global constitutionalism and on veto point theory to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the implications of ISDS mechanisms for public health policy. We then describe and explain the emergence and operation of ISDS mechanisms within IIAs. Finally, we examine two case studies of the use of BITs by a transnational tobacco corporation (TTC) to oppose evidence based public health policies in Uruguay and Australia. While we focus on TTCs here, the analytical lens we develop is more widely applicable to TNCs in other sectors (e.g. the food and alcohol industries) and other areas of public policy which may affect health (e.g. employment law, social policy and environmental protection).
Global Constitutionalism
Scholars have paid significant attention in recent years to processes of constitutionalisation above the level of the state (Thompson 2012 , May 2014 , Schwöbel 2012 , Schwöbel 2011 , Cass 2001 , Peters 2012 , Brown 2012 . While the extent and the nature of the constitutionalisation processes occurring is contested within the literature, Cass (2001: 41) notes that:
Common to all commentaries on the topic is an assumption that constitutionalisation includes a set of social practices, defined as law, and associated with Western industrialized democracies which structures the division of public power within a given community. So legal rules, principles, procedures, practices and institutions establishing the community, determining who has public power within it, and defining the scope of that power constitute the bulk of these practices on constitutionalisation. Beyond that provisional definition a range of variations are possible.
Global constitutionalisation thus refers to attempts to institutionalise and order governance processes above the level of the state through mechanisms analogous with state-level constitutions.
This involves the implementation of legal norms and judicialised forms of dispute resolution outside of the core domestic institutions of government and located instead in international or global bodies of various kinds. These developments can be seen as a response to the political, economic, societal and technological changes which are described collectively as globalization. Constitutions set out basic norms and principles which order the conduct of politics and attribute certain roles to specific actors and institutions, placing limits on their power and that of the state overall (Loughlin 2010 , Schwöbel 2011 . They define the rights afforded to, and responsibilities beholden of, the citizenry brought into being by those very constitutions. Constitutionalism is thus closely allied to liberal theories of politics, centred on human rights, individual autonomy and limited government (Loughlin 2010) . Schwöbel (2012) further dimension of global constitutionalism, in that it sets out a shared ideal for the future of the political community based on a specific set of social values and norms.
It is impossible to discuss (global) constitutionalism without also engaging with the associated concept of the rule of law (Thompson 2012). Christopher May (2014) has described the rule of law Consequently, global constitutionalism can be seen, in part at least, as the extension of the principle of the rule of law to the realm above the state (May 2014: 137) . At the global level, however, the absence of a sovereign power (i.e., a world government) to enforce the rule of law as at the state level has important implications. At the state level, constitutionalism is likely to produce constitutionalisation in a very concrete sense through the implementation and enforcement of written, binding constitutions. At the global level it is necessary to speak of constitutionalism in a much looser sense:
as a frame of mind or a particular approach towards governance based on the norms of the rule of law (May 2014: 139) . Global constitutionalism tends to produce multiple forms of constitutionalisation via a series of overlapping international agreements, which set out governance mechanisms and provide for dispute resolution on the basis of legal principles.
The discourse of global constitutionalism is indicative of more fundamental shifts in the theorisation and conduct of international politics in recent decades. Thompson (2012: 36) considerations. There is no obligation to balance trade and investment liberalisation against other competing social goods (e.g. the reduction of social inequalities). This means that economic liberalisation is placed in a privileged position over other policy objectives (Peters 2012) . Whilst IIAs allow governments, at certain times, to take measures which demur from the principles of free trade including in most instances in order to protect public health these are exceptions to the rule which must be justified and may be challenged. The default setting is towards a maximalist interpretation of agreements, with the onus on governments to find the least trade-distorting policy tool available to achieve a given end.
Corporations may favour moves towards global constitutionalisation because of the status and associated rights that constitutions afford to private actors in their capacity as legal persons (Thompson 2012). Political strategy the attempt to shape the regulatory environment in which a corporation is active in order to further its underlying commercial interests has long been recognised as a key component of corporate strategy, of equal importance to market strategy (Baron 1995) . Corporations have often used litigation to pursue their goals, but they have much to gain from going further than this by seeking to shape judicial structures themselves. Below, we link these developments in global constitutionalism to veto point theory, in order to draw out the implications of these trends for the making of health policy.
Veto Point Theory
Veto point theory offers an account of the policy-making process which focuses on the conditions necessary for policy change to occur by identifying the key points in the political and legal system where a policy may be blocked, i.e. legislative chambers, presidential offices, courts, etc. The veto of a policy at any one of these points is sufficient to prevent its adoption, so that the more veto points a system has the less likely it is to produce substantive policy change (Tsebelis 2002) . The number and institutional position of veto points in a given polity will vary according to the specific constitutional arrangements which govern it (e.g. if it is a presidential or parliamentary system). The focus on veto powers underlines the difficulties which exist in attempting to bring about policy change, and the inherent bias towards the status quo which exists in complex political systems.
Therefore, it makes more sense to think of veto point theory as an account not of policy change, but of policy stasis, although the degree of policy stability will vary between legislative contexts and policy areas depending on the range of different policy outcomes acceptable to key actors (Tsebelis
2002: 3).
T veto point veto player are often used interchangeably in the literature, although they imply subtle differences in the conceptualisation of political agency and the identification of relevant actors, which are of significance for the argument presented in this article.
Tsebelis (2002) task is to map out the policy-making process, in order to identify the points at which a policy may be blocked and the key actors involved at each juncture. However, the focus is not only on the preferences and actions of the institutional veto players themselves, but also on the key interest groups who may attempt to influence these preferences and/or to initiate the process of potential veto through the activities identified above. Given our focus on ability to stymie policy decisions, we follow Immergut (1992) in deploying the concept of veto points..
Veto point/player theory has been applied to a range of policy issues from voter turnout (Carlin and Love 2013) to state capture and bureaucratic corruption in Ukraine (Bagashka 2014 ). The majority of these studies focus on legislative processes in national contexts (Madden 2014 We argue that dispute resolution panels convened under the auspices of ISDS mechanisms are more akin to constitutional courts, having effective primacy over national laws which must be compatible with the strictures of the treaty. With the absence of appeal or judicial review procedures, ISDS panels have significant power to declare national laws incompatible with treaty obligations, with little possibility for their judgements to be challenged or set aside. Whilst it is possible in principle to revise international treaties, just as it is possible to revise national constitutions, or for countries to withdraw from international agreements, in practice this rarely happens. Furthermore, the proliferation of IIAs means that even if one agreement were revised or annulled, many more potential opportunities to challenge any given policy are likely to remain. governance systems allows corporate political actors to engage in venue shopping; i.e., to attempt to shift policy decisions to the level of governance or the decision-making forum in which they are most likely to achieve a favourable outcome (Coen 2007, Mazey and Richardson 2006) . The trend towards global constitutionalism, the increased complexity of the policy making process and the existence of multiple decision-making forums at different levels of governance, create new veto points at which policy actors can seek to halt forms of regulation they oppose. economic rationale for such a challenge is questionable given the negligible exports of the disputing states to Australia (Eckhardt et al. 2015) . It has been reported that the initiation of these proceedings followed extensive lobbying by TTCs (Jarman 2013) , who are also covering some of the legal costs of the Dominican Republic, Ukraine and Honduras (Martin 2013 Whilst the exact provisions of different IIAs vary, a decision in favour of the disputing corporation usually results in compensation rather than a legal requirement to change the law.
The Global Trade and Investment Regime and the Emergence of ISDS
However, the underlying objective for corporations bringing claims against states will in many instances not be financial, but to bring about repeal of the unfavourable law. Furthermore, the scale of potential awards against governments found to be in breach of their treaty obligations are extensive. In one ruling against the Czech Republic, for example, compensation demanded was (Van Harten 2007: 7) . Faced with such awards, governments may have no alternative but to change their laws rather than contest the claim and risk a tribunal award against them. The significant financial costs and the drain on government resources involved in contesting such a case create a further incentive to avoid litigation. Germany, for example, agreed to dilute the environmental protections it placed on coal fired power stations in order to settle a case brought against it by Swedish Energy conglomerate Vattenfall out of court (Eberhardt and Olivet 2012: 13) .
At times it may not even be necessary for corporations to initiate disputes in order to achieve their objectives. Their perceived willingness to challenge laws may be enough to deter governments from enacting controversial laws. The mere threat of litigation creates a on policy makers. In considering any new law, governments will consider the potential for a legal challenge, and may moderate, or even reject, proposed laws before they are passed (see also 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Tobacco Control Policy
In this section we use the foregoing discussion as a basis to analyse two examples of ongoing cases brought by TTCs under BITs, which highlight the importance of these agreements for tobacco control and wider health policy. Corporations actively seek to shape the regulatory environment in which they operate (Baron 1995) . There is now an extensively documented history of tobacco industry tactics employed to fend off regulation (Holden and Lee 2009) . The latest phase in TTC strategy is to use legal challenges under international trade and investment agreements (and other avenues) to prevent further limitations on their ability to brand and market their products. BITs create mechanisms through which TTCs and other corporations can challenge policies which allegedly undermine the guarantees they are afforded as investors. In the cases discussed here, TTCs have claimed that regulation of cigarette packaging constitutes expropriation of their trademarks.
Philip Morris and the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT
Uruguay is noteworthy within the context of Latin America for implementing far reaching tobacco control policies, including high levels of taxation and a ban on public smoking, which have led to a significant decrease in smoking prevalence and associated mortality and morbidity (Jarman 2015) . Following bans on advertising, promotion and sponsorship, the Uruguayan government enacted a tobacco control law in 2008 to require cigarette packaging to carry health warnings and graphic images covering 50% of their surface area, which was increased to 80% of the packs by a subsequent Presidential Decree (Jarman 2015 , Tobacco Tactics 2015 , McGrady 2012 A number of aspects of this case are of relevance to the present article. Uruguay is one of the few cigarette markets in the world which is not dominated by the major TTCs. As a country of 3 million people with declining smoking prevalence it is a small tobacco market of limited economic importance for TTCs. However, the policies put in place by the Uruguayan government would have enormous ramifications if implemented elsewhere in larger markets dominated by brands such as
Marlboro. As such, opposing these measures in Uruguay became of key strategic importance to TTCs, fearing policy contagion (Weiler 2010 ).
However, PMI action under the SUBIT cannot be seen simply as a defensive measure in response to a specific policy challenge, and the potential for a domino effect of similar measures across the region and beyond. As with previous and ongoing actions to challenge tobacco control policies under the WTO dispute resolution process, invoking SUBIT in this way is an attempt to re-define tobacco control as a trade issue, rather than a public health issue. Uruguay experience was to serve as a deterrent to other countries considering interventionist tobacco control policies (Weiler 2010 ). This point is made explicitly by TTCS themselves. It has been reported that at least four African countries Namibia, Gabon, Togo and Uganda have received warnings from the tobacco industry that their proposed laws run afoul of international treaties; the implication being that they too may also be the subject of legal proceedings such as those brought announcement of the proposed legislation to introduce plain packaging . This undermined any claims by PM Asia to have suffered materially from the decision, and that it had reasonable or legitimate expectations of a different regulatory environment at the time of investing in the country (Jarman 2013 (Jarman , 2015 . Critics had argued that this represented a cynical attempt by PMI to reorganise the structure of its holding companies solely to exploit Hong KongAustralia BIT to its commercial advantage , which was clearly out of keeping with the underlying objective of the agreement to protect legitimate investments, made in good faith. Whilst P M unsuccessful on this occasion, the ruling provides only partial succour to public health campaigners. The case was rejected not on the grounds that public health goals override those of investment protection but on the basis of a procedural issue around the timing of policy announcements and company decisions. The substantive point of law whether tobacco control measures such as generic packaging contravene the tenets of IIAs such as this remains to be tested. Consequently, legal challenges under ISDS clauses are an avenue which TTCs will continue to exploit. In the meantime, the mere threat of such actions may continue to have a chilling effect on governments elsewhere considering similar measures. to opt in to the tobacco carve out , rather than it applying automatically to all parties to the agreement. In other words, states will have to elect whether to exclude the tobacco sector from the protections provided by ISDS clauses in relation to investments within their territory. From an industry perspective this offers significant advantages over a uniform carve out oard.
TTCs will be able to lobby individual governments not to apply the carve out , thereby expanding the range of potential venues in which TTCs are able to bring cases. Whilst the TPP falls some way short 
Conclusion
This article builds on the existing scholarship on international trade, investment and health, adding a new analytical depth to the critique of current trade and investment negotiations, through an engagement with relevant theories and concepts from political science, international relations and international law. More specifically, it uses the concepts of global constitutionalism and veto points to deepen our understanding of the ways in which the emerging international trade and investment regime appears to lock in the current neo-liberal orthodoxy at the global level, undermining the ability of national governments to legislate to protect the health of their populations. ISDS clauses in IIAs create a powerful tool through which corporations can take legal action against governments which implement policies that potentially undermine their interests.
Since all laws enacted by national governments must be consistent with their obligations under international agreements, with significant financial penalties for non-compliance, the existence of ISDS clauses within these agreements creates de facto veto points within the policy making process, which may be exploited by powerful corporations seeking to ensure favourable regulatory environments. This may be especially true in LMICs which lack the resources to fight legal challenges under ISDS and to pay compensation to investors in cases they lose.
Furthermore, the increasing constitutionalisation of the global trade and investment regime has created a multiplicity of potential veto points at which policy may be challenged by TNCs. Given the expansion in the number of IIAs in recent years, countries may be signatories to multiple agreements under which a given policy could be challenged, in addition to potential challenges under WTO and domestic laws. The global reach of TNCs, together with the complex system of multi-level governance in which they operate, creates the possibility for corporations to venue shop in their pursuit of favourable policy outcomes. In addition, the PMI-Australian case discussed above suggests that TTCs are willing to engage in highly proactive forms of venue shopping in which they use the internal organisation of their businesses via a series of holding companies to take maximum advantage of the treaty obligations entered into by their host governments.
TNCs may try to stymie new laws through a strategy of simultaneous challenge in multiple venues. This point is well illustrated by the actions of TTCs in challenging tobacco control legislation in both the domestic courts and via BITs in both Uruguay and Australia, and additionally by supporting multiple countries to pursue WTO disputes against Australia. The failure of domestic litigation to secure its aims in no way deterred Philip Morris from continuing to pursue these via ISDS mechanisms within IIAs. Whilst the creation of new veto points does not entail a right of veto for corporations in any narrow sense, the creation of new institutional structures in which policy may potentially be blocked, which afford corporations, qua investors, with a privileged status versus other actors through which to secure their rights, militates strongly in favour of the status quo and of a pro-business environment. It creates a substantial disincentive to seek stronger healthprotecting regulations, since any government considering new regulations must weigh the benefits of these against the chances of success in multiple disputes and the potentially huge costs of engaging in litigation, or settling awards made by the arbitration panel against the state in question.
The disincentives for action are multiplied by the fragmentary nature of the investment arbitration system, and the inconsistent nature of panel rulings, which mean it is hard for governments to predict whether they will be able to successfully defend their policies against such claims. Whilst the current article focuses on health policy and the example of the tobacco industry, the analysis is relevant to other areas of public policy. It is perhaps in the areas of health, social and environmental policy that laws are most likely to be challenged and this chilling effect be felt, with 
